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Curbing International Overfishing and the Need for
Widespread Ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
I. Introduction
For the first half of this century, humankind focused its
expansion on land.' In the last fifty years, however, the combined
needs of national security, oil and gas, and food have driven
expansionist efforts toward the oceans.'
As a result, the
international community must struggle over how to share the
rights to the ocean.'
At the same time, rapidly improving
technology and an increased interest in fish as a food source have
led to tremendous growth in fishing.4 The world fishing fleet is
estimated at 1.2 million covered vessels, most of which operate in
Asia.5 The Chinese fishing fleet alone numbers 450,000 vessels,
one third of the entire world's fishing vessels.6 In 1997, the
world's fishing production reached 122 million tons, up one
million from 1996. 7 Over-fishing8 is now one of the biggest

I
2

See JOSEPH J.KALO et al., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 323-24 (3d ed. 1999).
See LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT:
93 (1996).
KALO, supra note 1, at 325.
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 107-09.

THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE

3
4

5 See Jorge Pina, Environment: Eighty CountriesSign Agreement to Curb Overfishing, Inter Press Service, Oct. 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library
[hereinafter Environment]. Representatives of 80 countries attended an October 1998
conference on overfishing to sign a voluntary agreement called "Elements of an
International Instrument for the Regulation of Fishing Capacity," which was presented at
the next FAO Fishing Committee meeting in February 1999. See id. The United
Nations agency stressed that world fishing capacity will continue to expand, but it must
be drastically reduced to allow certain species to repopulate, including Atlantic cod,
haddock, and temperate water tuna. See id. The agreement demands "efficient,
equitable and transparent control of the fishing capacity from here to 2005." Id. By
signing the agreement, the representatives acknowledged the problem of overfishing and
indicated that they are committed to progressively reducing their fishing capacity. See
id.
6
See id.
7

See id.
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threats the world's oceans face.9 Thirty-five percent of the 200

biggest fishing resources are experiencing a decline in yields while
twenty-five percent of the 200 biggest fishing resources are
experiencing a high level of exploitation. ° An amalgamation of
problems has caused the recent overfishing. First, technology has
allowed even small-scale fishermen to catch more fish faster and
more efficiently." Second, the 1980s saw the advent of the
"factory trawler fleets" made up of approximately twenty vessels. 2
Third, U.S. law, which was designed to prevent competition for
limited stocks from foreign nations, has actually encouraged
overfishing by U.S. fishermen. 3 Finally, countries have pushed

8

A species is deemed overfished based on scientific analysis, which considers

how fast the fish grow, how long they live, how rapidly they die due to natural causes,
how rapidly they die due to fishing, and what sort of fishing pressure can be sustained by
a particular stock. See Talk of the Nation: U.S. Fishing Laws (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 26, 1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter Talk of the
Nation]. United States law dictates that fish can be managed for "sustainable yield,"
which means a yield that can be taken each year without undermining the future of that
particular fish stock. See id.
9 See Julie R. Mack, Comment, International FisheriesManagement: How the
U.N. Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the
Law of Fishing on the High Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 313, 314 (1996).
1" See Environment, supra note 5; Scott Allen, Maine Gulf Cod Said to be Overfished, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 1998, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter
Maine Gulf Cod]. The Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank, off the northeastern coast of
the United States, are two examples of overfished regions. See id. In the two fisheries
the cod population has all but collapsed. See id. National Marine Fisheries Service
officials say cod is the thirteenth New England fish population that is officially overfished. See id.
I
See Talk of the Nation, supra note 8. Boats now are equipped with advanced
navigation systems and fish finders. See id. Fishermen once depended on experience
and knowledge, but now they increasingly rely on computerized equipment. See id. A
top-of-the-line vessel has a computerized system that locates fish, asks the operator if she
wants to catch the fish, and if the answer is yes, integrates the vessel's course with its
autopilot, steers toward the fish, lowers a net, and catches the fish. See id. If sensors in
the net indicate it is not full, the boat will turn around and catch more fish. See id.
12
See id.
'3
See id. In the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976, the United States established a 200 nautical-mile boundary where U.S. boats
had an exclusive right to fish. See id. The Act was in response to competition from
large fleets of vessels operating off New England and Alaska. See id. Yet, the result of
the Act was that U.S. fishermen were encouraged to grow in numbers. See id. They
built larger and more vessels and eventually eclipsed the amount of foreign effort. See
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for wider control over territorial seas,' prompting more developed
countries to call for international regulation of fisheries on the
high seas. 5 Their concerns arise from the actions of other states,
which have asserted control over vast regions of the high seas or
have largely ignored territorial boundaries
and fished just outside
6
nations.
other
of
seas
the territorial
Nations have made numerous attempts to regulate fishing
through the years.'7 No fishing agreement comprehensively
addressed the problem and presented a worldwide solution to the
problem until the third United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS 11)."8 Nations participating in
UNCLOS III addressed the need to conserve ocean resources,
preserve and protect the marine environment, and facilitate
communication between nations regarding these efforts. 9
"4
See KALO, supra note 1, at 322. A territorial sea is "a narrow offshore belt of
national authority for coastal states." Id. Its maximum breadth has been subject of
dispute for centuries. See id. In the United States and many other countries, the
territorial sea was three miles from the mean low water line of the coast because that was
the distance cannon could shoot in the early nineteenth century. See id. Inside the
territorial sea, a nation has sovereignty over the waters, the seabed, and living and
mineral resources, as well as the airspace above. See id. at 323.
15 See id. at 332.
16
See id. at 325. Following World War II, coastal countries were increasingly

concerned about the distant water fishing fleets of the Soviet Union, Japan, and a few
other nations. See id. These fleets could be seen fishing just outside the coastal nations'
territorial seas for fish stocks that were viewed by history and geography as belonging to
coastal states and their fishermen. See id.
17 See, e.g., GEORGE V. GALDOPRSI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF
THE SEA 158, 159 (1997) (focusing on the large volume of legislation and bilateral and
multilateral agreements the United States has been a party to relating to fisheries).
18
See John M. Deitch et al., The "Rio" Environmental Treaties Colloquium: A
Historical Perspective Leading up to and Including the United Nations Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 13 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 49,
52-54 (1995).
19 See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. The
preamble reads in part:

Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention,
with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the
seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication,
and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the
equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation
of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of
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Although UNCLOS III became binding in 1994, the United States2°
and other major fishing nations have not yet adopted it.
UNCLOS III could help the world slow overfishing through
adherence to its conservation and cooperation provisions." It
provides a framework for future agreements that can address
specific problems more fully.2 2 In fact, it has already been used to
negotiate fishing treaties. 23 The convention, however, needs
widespread support, particularly from the United States, to be truly
effective.24 This Comment addresses how UNCLOS III could help
solve the international overfishing problem. Section II discusses
the problem of overfishing and how it led to the third Law of the
Sea Convention. 5
Section III details specific provisions of
UNCLOS III and how they will affect overfishing. 6 Section IV
examines the effect of UNCLOS III to date. 27 This section also
touches on arguable drawbacks of UNCLOS III, specifically as it
relates to the Third World.28 Finally, this Comment concludes that
the marine environment ....
Id.
UNCLOS III actually is the third international attempt to resolve questions
over issues such as boundaries, national security, fishing and mineral rights. See Ian
Townsend-Gault, Regional Maritime Cooperation Post-UNCLOS/UNCED: Do
Boundaries Matter Any More, in INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SECURITY 3 (Gerald Blake et al. eds., 1997). Nations gathered for UNCLOS III in 1973.
See id. UNCLOS III was not complete until 1983. See id. The treaty became binding
on ratifying states on Nov. 16, 1994, when Guyana became the sixtieth ratifier. See id.
The United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS IUl. See id. President Clinton
transmitted the convention to the U.S. Senate in 1994, but the treaty has not yet made it
out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See id. As a law-making treaty,
UNCLOS III is binding only on nations that have agreed to it. See KALO, supra note 1,
at 337. Notably, for the treaty to be an effective law-making instrument, it is necessary
that all directly impacted states become parties to it. See KALO, supra note 1, at 317.
21
See John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Future of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 88 AM. J. INT'L L., 488, 498 (1994).
22
See Jonathan I. Charney, Entry into Force of the 1982 Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 401-02 (1995).
23
See id.; JUDA, supra note 2, at 255-56.
24
See Annick de Marffy-Mantuano, The Procedural Framework of the
20

Agreement Implementing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 814, 824 (1995); GALDORISI & VIENNA, supranote 17, at 143.
25
See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text.
26

See infra notes 70-233 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.

28

See infra notes 249-77 and accompanying text.
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widespread acceptance of UNCLOS Ill is desperately needed to
address overfishing.29
II. Historical Background Behind the Third Law of the Sea
Convention
Until the late twentieth century, an accurate world map would
have shown that nations' political boundaries were confined to
land. The ocean was open and free of political boundaries,3" but
this is no longer the case. An accurate world map today shows
This
political borders extending 200 miles into the ocean.'
protect
to
wanted
nations
some
because
largely
occurred
change
the rights of their citizens to fish in their own coastal waters, while
other nations wanted to assert their citizens' rights to fish in
distant waters.3" Many nations were concerned about the ongoing
competition for territory in the oceans.33 Establishing a new
"ocean legal order" was one of the primary goals of UNCLOS
111.1 4 Among the issues this new ocean legal order needed to
address were conservation and territoriality.35 Conflicts over
fishing rights and conservation efforts had erupted in various parts
of the globe.36 These conflicts over conservation and fishing rights
still occur.37

Overfishing and the potential for depletion of fish

resources often cause international conflict. In its provisions
addressing territory, conservation, and dispute resolution,
UNCLOS III attempts to resolve these problems.38 This section
will address the history of the law of the sea and the evolution of
UNCLOS Ill.
29
30

See infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
See KALO, supra note 1, at 314.

32

See id.
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 192-96.

31

See id.

34
31

Id. at 195-96.
See id. at 17 1.

36

See GALDORISI &

31

VIENNA,

supra note 17, at 24.

A series of international

incidents broke out in the 1960s involving fishing rights and conservation. See id.; JUDA,
supra note 2, at 171-80. The best known of these incidents were the "cod wars" among
Iceland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and United Kingdom. See GALDORISI &
VIENNA, supra note 17, at 24; Juda, supra note 2, at 171-80.
37
See infra, notes 186-232 and accompanying text.
See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 498.
38
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A. History
Throughout history, the seas have been considered "free"-too
wild to be occupied by nations and so vast that the concept of
ownership of their resources was "absurd."3 9 The only widely

accepted exception to the idea of "free seas" was the concept of
"territorial seas."4 A nation controlled the waters, seabed, and
marine resources within its territorial seas, as well as the air space
above. 4' The distance of the territorial seas varied by nation, but
most commonly extended three nautical miles from the shoreline.42
By the end of World War II, this began to change. Led by the
United States, nations began to assert control over more of the sea
in an effort to preserve fishing and mining rights and to protect
national security interests.43
In 1945, President Truman
proclaimed that the United States could set conservation rules for
its citizens and vessels fishing on the high seas outside U.S.
territorial waters.44 Truman also proclaimed for the United States
exclusive jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the
continental shelves adjacent to U.S. coasts.4 5
This was the current law of the sea when nations gathered for
39
KALO, supra note 1, at 322. This argument is credited to Hugo Grotius, a
Dutch jurist. See id.
40
Id. at 322.

See id. at 323.
See Chris Carleton, The Responsibilities of Coastal States on
Ratification/Accession to
UNCLOS, in INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, 26 (Gerald Blake et a]. Eds., 1997). A nautical mile is a unit
of linear measure used in navigation and is equal to 1852 meters. See WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 392 (3d college ed. 1990).
43
See KALO, supra note 1,at 324.
44
See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
45
See id. Kalo notes that the second of these proclamations was:
41

42

[A]lmost certainly illegal at the time because it asserted national authority over
resources of the seabed extending often far beyond the three-mile border of the
U.S. territorial sea and thus under the waters of the "free" high seas. In the
wake of a devastating war that had depended more than any other conflict on
access to petroleum, President Truman's desire to bring under U.S. control the
rich oil deposits of the continental shelf was perhaps understandable.
Recognizing the United States' new naval power role, the Truman Proclamation
was careful not to claim any right to infringe on the freedom of the high seas in
the waters above the continental shelf.
KALO,

supra note 1, at 324.

20001

U.N.

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

387

the first International Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS I). UNCLOS I convened in 1958.46 The impetus for
the convention was a series of events and trends that occurred after
World War 11, 47 including technological advancements that created
world-ranging fishing fleets and global navies and the entry of
new nations into the international community.48 Possibly the
biggest reason for concern for many coastal countries, including
the United States, was the presence of fishing fleets, primarily
from Japan and the Soviet Union, just outside the coastal nations'
territorial seas. 49 The foreign fishing vessels sought fish that the
coastal nations considered theirs by history and geography." ° In
addition, the Truman Proclamation set off a "chain reaction" of
similar legal claims by other countries.5 ' For example, between
1947 and 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru each claimed 200-mile
territories.52 Many maritime nations, especially those with large
navies and fishing fleets, opposed the 200-mile claims. 3 Despite
the opposition by industrial nations, many Third-World nations
followed the lead of the South American countries.54
As nations grabbed more and more ocean territory, the
international community decided that questions over territorial
waters needed to be resolved. 5 When nations met for UNCLOS I,
they addressed several pressing issues, including fishing and
conservation of resources." Yet they left unanswered the question
over the width of the territorial sea.57 Participants in UNCLOS I
failed to reach agreements on other disputes such as disagreements

46

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 138.

47

See KALO, supra note 1, at 325; JUDA, supra note 2, at 138-39.
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 138-39.

48

S0

See KALO, supra note 1, at 325.
See id.

51

JUDA,

49

52

supra note 2, at 113.
Seeid. at 114-15.

53

See id. at 115.

54

See KALO, supranote 1 at 326.
See GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 17, at 23.
See id. Because many nations have not yet ratified UNCLOS II or II, they

55
56

technically still are parties to the four treaties adopted at UNCLOS I. See KALO, supra
note 1, at 327.
57
See KALO, supra note 1, at 327.
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over fishing rights and conservation."
These issues were
addressed in later conventions.59
Nations met again in 1960 for UNCLOS II to solve the
problems over territorial boundaries and exclusive fishery zones. 60
Again they failed to resolve the issues. 6
By the 1960s, the
expansionist trend so threatened the United States and the Soviet
Union that the two superpowers agreed a third UNCLOS was
necessary. 62 UNCLOS III convened
in 1973.63 Nearly ten years
later, UNCLOS II was complete.64 The
Convention was opened

See id. at 330. For example, UNCLOS I attempted to regulate international
fishing through the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas. See id. The Fishing Convention allowed coastal nations to unilaterally
set nondiscriminatory conservation rules for threatened stocks in the high seas beyond
their territorial seas in the event that negotiations for international agreement on such
rules failed. See id. The convention also provided that in these instances, fishing
regulations eventually would be set by compulsory and binding international arbitration.
See id. The Fishing Convention passed by the requisite two-thirds vote and came into
force, but it was a failure. See id. As Kalo explained:
None of the leading distant water fishing nations became parties and, since the
treaty could not be legitimately characterized as a codification or articulation of
customary international law, these states had no obligation to observe high seas
fishing regulations set unilaterally by the countries off whose coasts they fished.
Thus, if high seas fishing were to be regulated at all, it would have to be by
bilateral or multilateral international agreement.
Id. at 331.
58

'9

See id. at 331.
See GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 17, at 24; JUDA, supra note 2, at 160.
Nations whose citizens participated extensively in distant-water fishing wanted the
agreement from UNCLOS I to stand. See JUDA, supra note 2, at 160. Developing
nations felt that it was inadequate. See id. at 160-62.
61
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 162.
60

See KALO, supra note 1,at 332.
63
See id. at 333-38. Representatives of coastal nations with large navies and
fishing fleets had the daunting task of negotiating an agreement that would benefit
conflicting national interests. See id. For instance, some U.S. fishermen and companies
with seabed mining interests favored a 200-mile zone and a 12-mile territorial sea. See
id. The U.S. government, however, objected to the 12-mile territorial sea because it
would mean losing the right of innocent passage through narrow straits, such as the
Straits of Gibraltar. See id.
64
See id. at 337. The vote to adopt the treaty passed 130 in favor and four
opposed, with 17 abstentions. See id. Although the vote on the treaty was delayed to
make last minute changes in an attempt to meet U.S. demands, the United States voted
against the treaty, citing what it considered a "flawed" deep seabed mining
administration. Id. For a more in depth discussion of deep seabed mining, see note 309
62
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for signature in December 1982.65 On November 16, 1993,
Guyana became the sixtieth ratifier, making the treaty binding on
all ratifying states as of November 16, 1994.66 By 1998, the treaty
had garnered the support of 126 parties.67 President Bill Clinton
presented the Convention to the United States Senate in October
1994, but as of the end of 1998, the treaty had yet to be ratified.68
III. UNCLOS III
UNCLOS III has been described as the "strongest
comprehensive environmental treaty now in existence or that is
likely to emerge for quite some time., 69 In part, this opinion stems
from the fact that the treaty is binding and, therefore, imposes
comprehensive obligations on all parties in a wide range of
environmental matters. 70 Because the threat of overfishing was
one of the primary reasons UNCLOS III convened-and because
it is one of the most serious problems facing the oceans todaynumerous UNCLOS III provisions address the problem.7 ' The
relevant provisions provide a framework on which to build more
specific treaties.72 UNCLOS III provides a number of components
essential for effective fishery conservation and management:
rational resource management regimes, cooperation, coordination,
and dispute settlement. 3

and accompanying text.
65
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 213.
66

See Deitch, supranote 18, at 54 n.17.

67

See KALO, supra note 1, at 337; United Nations Official Website (visited Jan.

27, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Dept/los/los94st.htm>.
68
See 140 Cong. Rec. 14,467 (1994). President Clinton also presented the
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention [hereinafter
Agreement] the same day. See id. The Agreement is a complicated document dealing
with deep seabed mining issues. The United States signed the Agreement on July 29,
1994. See id.
69
Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 496.
70

See id. at 494-95.

71

See UNCLOS IIl, supra note 19.
See Charney, supranote 22, at 401-02.

72

See id. at 404; Christopher J. Carr, Fisheries Management: Recent
Developments in Compliance and Enforcementfor InternationalFisheries,24 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 847, 850-51 (1997).
73
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A. Resource Management Regimes
Conflicts over conservation efforts and rights to use fisheries
were prevalent in the years leading up to UNCLOS III.7 4 As the
fish supply dwindled, coastal states pressed for more control over
living resources off their coasts.75 Other states, particularly
developing nations, worried about the increasing number of distant
water fishing vessels operating off their coasts.76 As a result of
these concerns, nations exerted their control farther and farther out
over waters off their coasts.77 UNCLOS III addressed these issues
by determining: 1) the zone in which a coastal state may control
fishing activities; and 2) how much power the coastal state should
have in those zones.78
1. Zones of Control
When UNCLOS III convened, the need to standardize the
boundary where state control ends and the high seas begin was
striking.7 9 One had only to look at the "cod war" between Iceland
and the United Kingdom to see why international boundaries
needed to be drawn in the oceans.8 ° In 1958, facing decreasing
catches and an increased presence of British fishermen in
Icelandic waters, the government of Iceland declared an exclusive
fishing zone around itself.8' Britain immediately protested and
deployed its navy to oversee fishing in Iceland." The two nations
clashed for three years before reaching an agreement. 83 The
agreement was short-lived, however, and Iceland and the United
Kingdom eventually had to take their dispute to the International
Court of Justice.84
By 1973, nations had claimed 4.5 million square nautical miles
74

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 170.

75

See id.

76

See id. at 192.

77
78

See id.
See id. at 213.

79

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 172.

80

See id. at 171-72.

81

See id. at 172-73.

82

See id. at 172, 175.

83

See id. at 175.

84

See id. at 176-77.
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of ocean. 5 One of UNCLOS III's primary goals was to create a
stable regime of coastal and maritime jurisdiction that all nations
would accept and which would accommodate the zones of control
that states already had claimed.86 The result forms the majority of
the Convention - Parts I through X.87 UNCLOS III divides the
oceans into five zones: 1) the territorial sea; 2) archipelagic
waters; 3) the exclusive economic zone; 4) the continental shelf;
and 5) the high seas.88

a. TerritorialSea
The territorial sea, a defined area under which a nation has
control with only a few limits, reaches twelve nautical miles.89
Although a coastal nation has considerable control over the
territorial sea, it still must grant any ship of any state the right of
innocent passage through its territorial waters.9 ° The Convention
specifically grants rights to coastal states, such as the right to
protect the living resources of the sea and the right to prevent the
infringement of fishery laws. 9'

b. Archipelagic Waters
Archipelagic nations are those comprised of island chains.92
The sovereignty of such a nation extends to the waters enclosed by
the archipelagic baselines, and may include straits, archipelagic
sealanes, separation schemes and areas that traditionally were
considered high seas. 93 UNCLOS III requires archipelagic states
to cooperate with other nations to recognize traditional fishing
85

See id. at 192.

86

See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 492.

87

See UNCLOS III, supra note 19, at pt. Il-X.

UNCLOS III contains 320

articles, 131 of which are devoted tojurisdiction issues. See id.
88 See id.
See UNCLOS IlI, supra note 19, art. 3; Carleton, supra note 42, at 19; Kalo,
supra note 1, at 342. In 1988, President Reagan extended by presidential proclamation
the U.S. territorial sea to 12 miles, carefully stating that the extension was consistent
with UNCLOS III. See KALO, supra note 1,at 343.
89

90
92

See UNCLOS Ill, supra note 19, art. 17-26.
See id., art. 21(1); Carleton, supra note 42, at 19.
See UNCLOS III, supra note 19, art. 46(a).

93

See UNCLOS II, supra note 19, art. 47, 49(1); see also Carleton, supra note

91

42, at 17.

392
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94

rights. Archipelagic states have broad control over their waters,
and are allowed to adopt measures to prevent, reduce, and control
pollution, fishing, smuggling, piracy, and immigration. 95
c. Exclusive Economic Zone
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) reaches from the mean
low-waterline seaward 200 nautical miles. 96 It is the most
significant of the zones created by the Convention.97 UNCLOS III
grants coastal states the sovereign rights of exploration and
exploitation of natural resources, as well as jurisdiction over
carrying out scientific research and the protection and preservation
of the marine environment within the EEZ. 98 A coastal state,
however, cannot restrict another nation's freedom to fly over,
navigate through, lay pipelines, or lay cables in the EEZ. 99 Coastal
states may determine allowable catches of living resources in the
EEZ, by "taking into account the best scientific evidence
available" regarding the size and health of fish populations.) ° In
addition, allowable catches must be designed to "maintain or
restore populations of harvested species° at levels which can
produce the maximum sustainable yield."''
Although the convention grants coastal states control over
living resources in their EEZs, it also requires a great deal of
cooperation with other nations. For example, a coastal state that
cannot harvest the entire allowable catch must grant other nations
the right to harvest the balance.' °2 The nations fishing the
remainder of the allowable catch must allow the coastal state the
right to place trainees and observers on board their fishing vessels
so that the coastal nation can learn new technology and techniques
and eventually take advantage of the maximum allowable

94

See UNCLOS IH, supra note 19, art. 5 1(1).

"

See id., at art. 49; Carleton, supra note 42, at 18.
See UNCLOS III, supra note 19, art. 57.

96
97

98

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 216.
See UNCLOS IH, supra note 19, art. 56(1).

99 See id. art. 58(1).
100 Id. art. 61(2).
101 Id. at art. 61(3).
102

See id. art. 62(2).
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harvest.' °3 Cooperation is required for conservation efforts as
well. '°4 In all instances, the goals are conservation and maximum
utilization.' 5
d. ContinentalShelf

Under another provision of UNCLOS III, coastal nations may
exploit and explore the natural resources of the continental shelf
even beyond the EEZ.'16 The natural resources of the continental
shelf are defined as non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil
The term
and "sedentary species" of living resources.' 7
"sedentary species" has not been clearly defined.' 8 The U.S.
claims that "sedentary species" include lobsters and crabs. ,09
e. High Seas
Delegates at UNCLOS III recognized a need to address
jurisdiction on the high seas."0 The result is UNCLOS III, Part
VII. Article 87 provides that the high seas "are open to all States,
Thus, all states have the
whether coastal or land-locked."'
freedom to fish on the high seas, subject to certain conditions."'
103 See id. art. 62(4)(g).

See id. art. 62(4).
See KALO, supra note 1,at 347. In an effort to implement this goal, nations
drafted a new treaty called the 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (the fish stocks agreement). See 141 Cong. Rec. 3862 (1995).
The fish stocks agreement "urges the creation of effective regional organizations,
includes innovative enforcement provisions, and adopts what is perhaps the most
detailed 'hard law' version of the precautionary approach, an emerging principle of
international environmental law that requires resources managers to exercise caution in
the face of scientific uncertainty." 141 Cong. Rec. 3862 (1995). The United States has
ratified the fish stocks agreement and has begun implementing some of its provisions.
See 141 Cong. Rec. 3862 (1995).
106
See UNCLOS IlI, supra note 19, art. 76.
1o4
105

107 Id. art. 77(4).
1o8

KALo, supra note 1,at 352.

109 Id.

"10 See id. at 359. The high seas are defined in UNCLOS III, pt. VII, art. 86, as
"all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State." UNCLOS III, supra note 19, pt. VII, art. 86.
II
UNCLOS HI, supranote 19, pt. VII, art. 87(1).
112
See id. UNCLOS II recognizes six freedoms on the high seas. These are: 1)
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Those nations exercising the freedom to fish must do so "with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of freedom
of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this
Convention with respect to activities in the area."" 3 Article 117
requires nations to take measures "as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas."' 1 4 This area,
however, requires clarification." 5 It is unclear what "due regard"
means, or what its impact might be on international regulations
involving activities on the high seas, such as driftnet fishing." 6
Other provisions that impact fishing relate to "flagging" of
vessels on the high seas." 7 UNCLOS III allows every nation to
sail ships flying their flags on the high seas."' The treaty,
however, requires every nation to "fix the conditions for the grant
of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships and for the
right to fly its flag."" 9 In addition, there must be a "genuine link"
between the State and the ship.'2 ° States have jurisdiction over
ships flying their flags, and they must control the activities of
those ships.' Thus, nations are responsible for making sure that
their ships adhere to fishing conservation laws on the high seas.'22
B. Cooperationand Coordination
The definitions of ocean territory did not fully address the
problems fishing nations faced, however, because fish do not
adhere to political boundaries.'23 As a result, UNCLOS III
freedom of navigation; 2) freedom of overflight; 3) freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines; 4) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted
under international law; 5) freedom to fish; and 6) freedom of scientific research. See id.
art. 87(l)(a-f).
"13
Id. art. 87(2).
114 Id. art. 117.
"5
116

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 259.
See id.

See id. at 275. "Flagging" refers to the requirement that a nation control
vessels flying its flag. See id.
"8 See UNCLOS I, supra note 19, art. 90.
117

120

Id. art. 91(1).
Id.

121

See id. art. 94.

122

See id. art. 117.

123

See

119

JUDA,

supra note 2, at 258.
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stipulated that states should work out their differences in conflicts
involving fish that move between national boundaries.124 These
provisions and others call for cooperation and coordination of
conservation efforts among nations. This is a hallmark of
UNCLOS III. While UNCLOS III generally does not provide
enough detail to solve all overfishing problems immediately, it
does provide goals and objectives for future agreements.' 25 The
cooperation and coordination provisions provide the framework
that guides the international community toward a unified
conservation effort. 2 6 Nations will no longer be able to act
unilaterally to exploit natural resources from the sea as a result of
the numerous provisions calling for cooperation. 2 7 According to
scholar Ian Townsend-Gault, although UNCLOS Ill allows
nations to draw boundaries, the existence of boundaries is less
important than the cooperation necessary to ensure that the
boundaries and policies within them are respected. 2 He writes:
It is now clear that in the areas of ocean environment and
resource management, convergence of approach on either side
of a boundary are essential .... It is clear that a living resource
management regime for a marine ecosystem must have a unity
transcending the boundaries or jurisdictional areas therein is
essential. This is the essential thrust of the cooperation
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention."'

Proponents of the convention in the United States and in other
nations say its cooperation provisions will help resolve disputes in
several areas of the world. 3° UNCLOS III's principles are already
124

See id.

125

See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 497-98.

126

See Charney, supranote 22, at 403-04.

See Townsend-Gault, supra note 20, at 5. Townsend-Gault acknowledges,
127
however, that some nations will be more self-sufficient under the convention than others:
"Comparatively remote countries such as Australia and New Zealand might be expected
to have a degree of freedom which will be denied states in areas such as the Gulf of
Thailand, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Gulf, and the Mediterranean." Id.
128

See id. at 12-13.

129

Id.

See 141 Cong. Rec. S3862 (1995). Senator Pell argued before the Senate that
UNCLOS UI would benefit U.S. efforts to resolve fishing disputes:
130

The United States has long taken a pro-active approach to fisheries, both within
its own exclusive economic zone and on the high seas. Through these recent
successful negotiations, we have ensured that our international partners will be
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being used in some instances."'
1. Straddling Stocks/Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
Article 63 addresses how states should manage fish stocks that
exist between two EEZs or between a coastal nation's EEZ and an
area beyond it.' 32 Where stocks occur in the EEZs of two or more
adjacent states, Article 63 directs the states to "seek ...to agree

upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the
conservation and development of such stocks .

. ,,,""
Where

stocks overlap between a nation's EEZ and the high seas, the
to agree
coastal state and the states fishing the stock "shall seek ...

upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks.
,,134

Nations fishing for highly migratory fish 135 must also

''cooperate ...
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting
the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the36
region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone.'
If no international organization exists for the purpose of
coordinating optimum utilization of the species, nations are
submitted to no less stringent rules. The United States will put an end to
overfishing and further depletion of threatened stocks only if we can ensure that
sound management practices are applied by the other major fishing nations.
This is why the administration has negotiated in earnest to achieve what are
widely perceived as breakthrough advances in strong and responsible
arrangements.
Id.
131

See id.

132

See UNCLOS Il, supra note 19, at art. 63.

These are called "straddling

stocks." Carr, supra note 74, at 850. Straddling stocks occur in fisheries such as the
northwest Atlantic cod fishery, pollack fisheries in the Bering Sea (also known as the
"Donut Hole") and the Sea of Okhotsk (known as the "Peanut Hole"), redfish fisheries in
the Berents Sea (called the "Loop Hole"), and fisheries for a variety of pelagic species
off Argentina's Patagonian Shelf. See id.
133 Id. at art. 63(1).
134
Id. at art. 63(2).
135 Highly migratory fish have habitats that range over vast areas of the ocean,
sometimes in and out of the EEZs of several nations. See Mack, supra note 9, at 314
n.11. These fish include: albacore tuna, bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna,
yellowfin tuna, blackfin tuna, little tuna, southern bluefin tuna, frigate mackerel,
pomfrets, marlins, sailfishes, swordfish, sauries, dolphin fish, and oceanic sharks. See
UNCLOS Il, supra note 19, at Annex I.
136
See UNCLOS IH,supra note 19, at art. 64(1).
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required to cooperate to establish one and to participate therein.'37
Unfortunately, these articles do not specify how nations are to
cooperate or what to do if cooperation fails.'38 Yet subsequent
treaties that build 39on the principles of UNCLOS III have partially
filled in this void.
2. Anadromous/CatadromousSpecies
Similar problems have erupted over anadromous and
catadromous stocks.' In these cases, nations may be taking fish
that spend most of their life on the high seas or in the waters of
one nation, yet spawn in the waters4 1of another. Articles 66 and 67
address conservation of these fish.'
States where anadromous stocks originate have a primary
interest in and responsibility for the stocks.14 The nation of origin
must ensure their protection by establishing a conservation plan
for the fish within the state's EEZ.' 43 The Convention allows
fishing for anadromous stocks only within the state's EEZ except
when the regulation would "result in economic dislocation for a
State other than the State of origin."'" In these cases, UNCLOS
III directs states to work out an arrangement with both nations'
interests in mind.4 Agreements between the state of origin and
the other states concerned must regulate fishing for anadromous

131

See id.
See Deitch, supra note 18, at 55. This failure was not accidental. UNCLOS
III participants attempted to find a workable solution, but they could not. See id. at 5556.
'I
See id. at 56. Examples include the North Pacific Anadromous Stocks
Convention, the "Donut Hole" Convention, and the Food and Agriculture Organization
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. See 141 Cong. Rec. S3862 (1995).
140
See George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Global Agreements Regarding Overfishing at
Sea, 6 S.C. ENVT'L L.J. 1, 13, 14 (1997). Anadromous stocks are fish that migrate
upriver to spawn. See id. at 13. Catadromous stocks are those that migrate downriver to
the sea to spawn. See id. at 14.
141 See UNCLOS III, supra note 19, art. 66, 67.
142
See id. art. 66(1).
138

143
144
145

See id. art. 66(2).
Id. art. 66(3)(a).
See id. art. 66(3)(a-b).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

398

[Vol. 25

146
stocks that migrate to the high seas.
The coastal nation where catadromous species spend the
majority of their life cycles is responsible for managing the fish
and ensuring that they can migrate.147 As with anadromous fish,
48
catadromous species may be harvested only within the EEZ.
When the fish migrate through more than one EEZ, states must
implement
conservation
agreements
through
regional
organizations."'

3. Other ProvisionsRelating to Cooperation
Numerous other provisions call for nations to cooperate in
conservation efforts. For example, Article 117 calls for nations to
"take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures
for their respective nationals as may be necessary for conservation
of living resources of the high seas."'"5 Nations also must
cooperate with each other when they harvest the same fish in one
area of the high seas or when they exploit different resources in
the same area. 5 ' In these cases, nations are encouraged to
establish "subregional or regional fisheries organizations"
dedicated to resource conservation. 5 2 Finally, Article 119 calls for
nations to share scientific data regarding fish stocks.'53 The shared
information is used to draw up conservation plans for harvesting
stocks at levels that will produce the maximum sustainable yield.'54
C. Dispute Settlement
UNCLOS IlI's provisions on dispute resolution"' may
guarantee long-term stability in the law of the sea. 5 6 More
specifically, the dispute resolution provisions would help resolve
146

See id. art. 66(3)(d).

147 See id. art. 67(1).
148

See it art. 67(2).

149 See id. art. 67(3).
15' Id. art. 117.
151
152

See id. art. 118.
Id.

153 See id. art. 119(2).
154 See id art.

119(1)(a).

155 See id.arts. 279-299 & Annexes V-VHI.
156

See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 492.
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disputes between nations regarding overfishing or conservation
efforts.'57 Historically, nations have resisted treaties that invoke
the jurisdiction of courts and arbitrators.'58 If widely ratified, this
aspect of the convention alone would mean a radical departure for
international law. 9
The convention provides for dispute
resolution in three basic ways: 1) by encouraging peaceful
settlement of disputes, 6 ° 2) by providing for non-binding methods
of fact-finding and conciliation as well as other special dispute
settlement vehicles,' 6' and 3) by establishing a compulsory,
binding dispute settlement process.12
1. Peaceful Dispute Settlement
Article 279 requires nations to settle disputes peacefully and in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.'63 Nations may
choose to settle their disagreements by any peaceful means, 114 or
they may take the65 dispute to another procedure that provides a
binding decision.
2. Non-binding Methods
The Convention compels nations to decide "expeditiously"
whether166 to resolve their disputes by negotiation or other peaceful
means,
to submit to dispute settlement under Annex V of the
C
.• or 167
Convention.
Annex V provides for conciliation of disputes by
five conciliators nominated by the states. '
The conciliation
commission hears the parties' claims and objections and makes
'""

160

See 141 Cong. Rec. S3862 (1995).
See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 499.
See id.; Charney, supra note 22, at 389, 390.
See UNCLOS In, supra note 19, at arts. 279-80.

161

See id. at art. 284 & Annex V, § 1.

162

See id. at arts. 286-91 & Annexes VI-ViI. See also Charney, supra note 22, at

157
158

"I

390.
163

See UNCLOS III, supra note 19, at art. 279.

'1
165

See id. at art. 280.
See id. art. 282.

166

Id. art. 283(1).

167

See id. art. 284(1); Annex V.

168

See id. Annex V, art 3.3(a)-(d).
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69
suggestions on how the parties can reach an amicable settlement.
The decision of the commission, however, is not binding on the
parties. 7 0

3. Binding Dispute Settlement
If parties to a dispute are unable to resolve their differences,
they must submit to one of the compulsory and binding dispute
settlement procedures provided in the Convention."' The form of
dispute settlement may be determined by written declaration of the
states from one of four specified methods. 7 States can choose the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, created by
UNCLOS III Annex VI;'73 the International Court of Justice; an
arbitral tribunal created according to UNCLOS III Annex VII;7 4 or
a special arbitral tribunal drawn up under Annex VIII. 1' If the
parties have not selected the same dispute settlement procedure, it
will be decided under Annex VII unless the parties otherwise
agree.' Courts or tribunals deciding disputes must apply the rules
of the Convention or77other rules of international law compatible
with the Convention.1
In a recent dispute, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) and

169

See id Annex V, art. 6.

170

See id Annex V, art. 7(2).

'71

See id. art. 286.
See id. art. 287(1) (a)-(d).

172

173
Annex VI sets out how the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is
constituted. See id. Annex VI. The seat of the tribunal is Hamburg, Germany, but it
may sit anywhere. See id. Twenty-one independent members make up the tribunal. See
id. At least three must be from each geographic group. See id. Decisions by the tribunal
are binding. See id.
174
Annex VU describes the procedure for arbitration under the convention. See
id. Annex VU. The arbitral tribunal is made up of five members. Each party chooses
one member, and the other three are chosen by agreement of the parties. See id.
Decisions by the tribunal are binding and not subject to appeal. See id.
175
Annex VHI describes the procedure for special arbitration under the
convention. See id. Annex VIII. Any party with a dispute involving fishing, protection
or preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research or navigation may
choose to have disputes heard by the special tribunal. See id. The tribunal is staffed by
experts in each of the fields listed above. See id. The tribunal follows a procedure
similar to that of Annex VII. See id.
176
See id. art. 287(3), (5).
177

See id. art. 293(1).
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Guinea are using the dispute settlement procedure under UNCLOS
III to resolve a conflict over Guinea's detention of an SVG vessel
and its crew. 17' This case does not involve overfishing, but it
illustrates how the UNCLOS III procedure works. SVG took the
case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 1997
after Guinea impounded the "Saiga," an oil tanker Guinea claims
was impermissibly supplying oil to fishing vessels and other
vessels operating off its coast. 7 9

Guinean customs officials

arrested the "Saiga" crew on the high seas. 8° Guinea contends the
"Saiga" was involved in smuggling and that pursuant to UNCLOS
III article 111, it arrested the crew after hot pursuit from Guinea's
exclusive economic zone." ' DVG claims that Guinea violated
UNCLOS
III by not promptly releasing the "Saiga" and her
182
crew. In December 1997, the Tribunal ordered Guinea to release
the "Saiga" and her crew upon posting of reasonable bond or
security

in

compliance

with

UNCLOS

III article

73(2).83

Complete resolution of this conflict is ongoing but it is clear that
the Tribunal provides a valid alternative for resolving disputes that
arise under UNCLOS 111.184
D. CurrentEvents
As national governments debate the merits of joining
UNCLOS III, international conflicts over fishing rights continue to
develop throughout the world. Of particular note are: 1) disputes
in the Spratly Islands of southeast Asia; 2) negotiations between
178

See St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea (the MV Saiga), 37 I.L.M. 360,

363, 367 (Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea 1998).
179

See id at 368.

180

See id.

181
See id. UNCLOS I1 art. 111 allows the authorities of a coastal nation to
pursue a foreign ship on the high seas if the chase begins in the coastal nation's waters
and if the authorities have "good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and
regulations of that state." UNCLOS HI, supra note 19, art. 111(1).
182
See St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea (the MN Saiga), 37 I.L.M. at

366. Specifically, SVG claims Guinea violated art. 73(2). See id. Art. 73(2) provides
that "Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of
reasonable bond or other security." UNCLOS IlI, supra note 19, at art. 73(2) See id.
183
See St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea (the MN Saiga), 37 I.L.M. 3 at
377.
184
See St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea (the MN Saiga No. 2), 37
I.L.M. 1202 (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 1998).
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Japan and South Korea over the Islets of Takeshima; 3)
negotiations between China and South Korea involving shared
waters; and 4) conflicts over conservation practices between
Canada, Spain, and the United States. These disputes illustrate
some of the issues that need to be settled to solve the overfishing
problem. In each instance, agreements are being worked out in
accordance with UNCLOS III. Unfortunately, although UNCLOS
III provides the framework to begin resolving these disputes, a
great deal of uncertainty surrounding international fishing
regulation continues."' In many instances who has the power to
dictate fishing rights and territory remains unclear.'86 In some
cases, fishing practices that lead to unhealthy depletion of fish
stocks continue unchecked.'87 In other instances, temporary
solutions are implemented, but the future still is unknown.'88
Widespread acceptance of UNCLOS III would provide the
necessary structure to resolve these tenuous situations.
1. Spratly Islands
In the Spratly Islands of central east Asia, fishing is just one of
many disputes among six nations.'
In December 1998, the
Philippines arrested twenty Chinese fishermen in the disputed
waters on Alicia Annie Reef near Mischief Reef and charged them
with illegal fishing.' 90 Philippine officials alleged that the Chinese
fishermen placed sodium cyanide in the fertile fishing grounds.' 9'
This method kills some fish but stuns others, which allows the fish
to be sold alive to expensive restaurants in Japan and Hong
185

See David A. Colson, Conserving World Fish Stocks and Protecting the

Marine Environment Under the Law of the Sea Convention, in 141 CONG. REc. S3862
(1995).
186
See Philippines Unlikely to Prosecute Detained Chinese Fishermen, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News
Section.
87
See id.
188

See id.

See Lower House Oks Fishing Pact, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 14, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. The nations are the Philippines, China, Brunei,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. See id.
190 See id.
189

191 See David Lamb, Spratly Spat Heats up Over Chinese 'Bullying'; Asia:
Philippines Steps up Patrols in Response to Increased Activity in the Strategic Island
Chain, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A4.
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Kong.' 92 The Philippines claims the islands under UNCLOS

III.' 9'

The Convention allows nations to regulate fishing within 200
nautical miles from its shore. 194 This area is known as the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).' 9' China claims the islands by
discovery and occupation.196 China also passed a law making the
Spratlys officially part of its territories.' 97
Conflicting claims to the Spratlys have been a source of
dispute for many years.'98 In addition to the Philippines and China,
Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan all claim part or all of the
archipelago.' 99 The islands are of recent interest because they
straddle key shipping lanes and may be rich in oil, minerals and
other marine resources.'0
The fall 1998 conflict over fishing
occurred after the Philippines stepped up naval and air force
patrols of the islands.2 ' Philippine pilots flying over the Spratlys

reported seeing concrete garrison-style structures, anti-aircraft gun
emplacements, a helipad, radar facilities, a landing strip, and an
air-raid shelter.2"2 Chinese warships have been photographed
deployed near Mischief Reef.03 Docks and structures on the reef
appeared to be under construction."" U.S. and central east Asian
officials consider China's activities acts of aggression.'O
192

See id.

193

195

See Chinese Ambassador Presses for Release of Fishermen,
Dec. 21, 1998, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.
See id.
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 228.

196

See Charles Liu, Comment, Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A

DEUTSCHE

PRESSE-AGENTUR,
194

PragmaticSolution to the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 865,
871 (1996).
197
See Estrada Orders NICA to Define RP Boundaries, BUSINESSWORLD
(Philippines), Dec. 11, 1998, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.
198
See Liu, supra note 197, at 868-75.
199

See Lamb, supra note 192.

200 See id.
201

See Estrada Deploys Patrol Boats, Planes to Disputed Islands,

DEUTSCHE

1998, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.
See Lamb, supra note 191.
See id.
See id.

PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 10,
202

203
204

See U.S. Congressman Calls Chinese Structures "an Act of Aggression,"
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Dec. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
205
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Nevertheless, China maintains that the facilities on Mischief Reef
are for fishermen. 206
2. Tokdo/Takeshima
Another dispute over shared territory is being negotiated more
peacefully. Like the conflict over the Spratlys, however, the
disputes between Japan and South Korea are longstanding, and
will not be solved for years to come.2 °7 Japan and South Korea
accuse each other of illegal fishing practices and of overfishing in
the Sea of Japan. °8 In December 1998, the lower house of the
Japanese Diet approved a bilateral fishing pact with South Korea
that was written under the auspices of UNCLOS 111.209 The deal
allows Japanese and South Korean vessels to fish in each others'
EEZs. 2'0 The two nations will annually negotiate issues such as
fishing quotas.2"' In addition, "a provisional joint fishing zone will
be established in the waters surrounding" the islets of
Takeshima," ' which both nations claim. 23 A joint fisheries
committee also "will be formed to settle issues such as the number
of vessels allowed to fish in the areas., 21 4 At this point, however,
these agreements remain merely provisional.1 5
3. South Korea and China
Similarly, South Korea and China have worked out temporary
solutions to share fishing waters off their coasts. South Korea and
206

See Lamb, supra note 191.

207

See Benjamin K. Sibbett, Note, Tokdo or Takeshima? The TerritorialDispute

Between Japanand the Republic of Korea, 21

FORDHAM INT'LL.J.

1606, 1609 (1998).

See Tokyo, Seoul Reach Basic Accord on Fisheries Pact, THE XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Sept. 25, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library; FisheriesAccord to Rest in
Hands of Top Foreign Policymakers, THE KOREA HERALD, Sept. 11, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library.
209
See Lower House OKs Fishing Pact, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 14, 1998,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.
208

211

See id.
See id.

22

See id. South Korea calls the islands Tokdo. See id.

213

See id.

214

See id.

215

See Lower House Oks Fishing Pact, THE

210

availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library.

NIKKE1 WEEKLY,

Dec. 14, 1998,
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China agreed in October 1998 to examine the idea of creating a
temporary fishing zone in waters adjoining the two countries
before setting their two hundred-mile EEZs under UNCLOS 111.216
The two nations signed the pact in November 1998.217 The
agreement sets up fishing zones and a joint fishing committee
"empowered to oversee operations by fishing vessels" in one of
the shared fishing zones "with the aim of protecting resources and
balancing fishing activities by both sides. 2 8 The agreement also
calls for fishing boats of each side to operate freely in the area of
the East China Sea where the 200 nautical-mile EEZs of China,
South Korea and Japan overlap. 1 9 Officials from the Asia-Pacific
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade say
the agreement will set a precedent for countries that have difficulty
drawing up EEZs in overlapping waters.
4. Canada
The effects of overfishing may be the most devastating in
Canada.22 ' As a result, Canada has made drastic decisions in an

216

See S. Korea, China to Explore Zoning Temporary Fishing Area, ASIA

PULSE,

Oct. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. The two sides agreed that the most
pressing need is to set "a fishing order in the Yellow Sea and the sea surrounding Cheju
Island." Id.
217
See S. Korea and China Sign FisheryAgreement, ASIA PULSE, Nov. 11, 1998,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library. The agreement establishes exclusive, temporary and
transitionary fishing zones. See id.
218

Id.

219

See id.South Korean officials said they expect the agreement "will effectively

expel Chinese vessels operating in waters near South Korean territorial waters which
contributed to reduction in fishery resources there and contamination of maritime
environment." Id.
220
See id.
221
See Deitch, supra note 18, at 67-69. Cod fishing has been called the
"economic and spiritual sustenance of Canadian existence." Id. at 68 (quoting David
Usbome, Empty Seas Lash Newfoundland, Cod Piratesand Factory Ships Have Robbed

a Canadian Community of its Centuries-old Way of Life, THE INDEPENDENT, May 1,

1994, at 15). When Italian explorer John Cabot entered Canadian waters near the
province of St. John's in 1497, he reported the codfish schools were so thick his crew
had difficulty rowing. See id. at 67-68. Times have changed. Between 1985 and 1994,
the cod catch plummeted from 635,000 tons to 15,000 tons. See id at 68. Almost
50,000 fishermen and plant workers are out of work because of the collapse of the
Canadian cod and groundfish industries. See id. The primary reasons for the decline
appear to be overfishing and mismanagement. See id.
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attempt to save the fish stocks. In the 1990s, the northern cod
fishery off the Grand Banks near Canada collapsed.222 Canada
made the unpopular decision to close the fishery in an attempt to
maintain sustainable fish stocks within its EEZ.223 The decision
focused attention on nations fishing the same stocks outside
Canada's EEZ.22 4 The result was the so-called "turbot [cod] war,"
an open conflict with fishermen from outside Canada who were
perceived to be contributing to the problems on the Grand
Banks. 5 In 1995, a Canadian vessel fired warning shots and
impounded the "Estai," a Spanish fishing vessel operating on the
Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland. 6 In a discussion
about the United States' ratification of UNCLOS III, U.S. Senator
Claiborne Pell argued before the U.S. Senate that similar incidents
could be avoided in the future if UNLCOS III gains widespread
support:
Had Canada and Spain both been party to the Law of the Sea
Convention, this dispute could have been settled without the
firing of shots. Regrettably, such incidents are the result of the
growing uncertainty that prevails with regard to high seas
fisheries and will only be avoided if the Convention on the Law
of the Sea becomes a widely recognized instrument on which ...
to establish a lasting regime for those fisheries."'
In 1995, Spain applied to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to decide the case. 8 Spain claimed Canada's actions were
in flagrant violation of international principles and norms,
including UNCLOS III, relating to freedoms of the high seas and
exclusive jurisdiction over ships by the state whose flag it is
flying."2 9 In December 1998, the ICJ decided it did not have
222

See Marcus Haward, Management of Marine Living Resources: International

and Regional Perspectives on Transboundary Issues, in INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: FRAMEWORKS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 41, 42
(Gerald Blake et al. eds., 1997).
223
See id.
224

See id.

225

See id.

226

See 141 CONG. REC. 3862 (1995).
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Id.
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See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 96 (Dec. 4) (visited

October 4, 1999) <http://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/idocket/iec/iecframe.html>.
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See id.
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jurisdiction over the dispute.23 °
In another instance, Canada sparred with the United States
over fishing rights. In 1994, Canada developed a plan to levy a
$1100 fee on United States fishing vessels that travel along the
650-mile Inside Passage from Puget Sound, Oregon and
Washington to Alaska.23' Senator Pell argued:
The State Department concluded that this transit fee was
inconsistent with international law, and particularly with the
transit rights guaranteed to vessels under customary
international law and the Law of the Sea Convention. Had the
United States and Canada both ratified the Law of the Sea
Convention . .

.

. [T]he Canadians might have been more

hesitant to take the steps they did. In any event, the full force of
the convention and the international community could have been
brought to bear for a prompt resolution of the dispute. 232
Thus, according to Senator Pell, UNCLOS III could help the
United States resolve its international conflicts over fishing.
IV. Effect of UNCLOS III and Concerns for the Future
The magnitude of the overfishing problem was articulated by
Vito Calomo, a former third-generation sea captain from
Gloucester, Massachusetts, on National Public Radio's "Talk of
the Nation.,

233

Calomo, a guest on the show, which focused on

U.S. fishing policies, got out of the fishing business because:
I seen [sic] the decline and I had an opportunity to get out, and I
got out at the right time ....The right time was when I used to
tow a net for an hour, say in the Georges Banks area, and I used
to catch one thousand pounds of haddock, and I would do the
same tow and catch ten haddock in count ....I absolutely can

point a finger: We the people have to blame [sic]. We have
mismanaged, we have over-fished, and we have polluted. That's
the three biggest I see. 234
The changes in international fishing law that UNCLOS III
provides could help reverse the loss Calomo and his peers
experience. Forty years ago, international law of the sea focused
230

See id.

231

See 141 Cong. Rec. S3862 (1995).

232

Id.

233

See Talk of the Nation, supra note 8.

234

Id.
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on nations' rights to unilaterally exploit the resources of the sea.235
UNCLOS III requires them to consider interdependence and
sustainable development in managing the resources within their
EEZs. 236 As William G. Stormont noted, ocean management today
"requires a high level of integration between competing maritime
sectors which allows for each activity to proceed without
negatively impacting the others. In determining domestic policy, a
country must be aware of the potential negative impact of its
policies on neighboring states, the immediate region and interregionally."237
Although the requisite number of nations has ratified the
Convention, many large industrial nations with huge fishing fleets
have not. Among these are the United States and Canada. 38 In
addition, some have complained that the Convention does not
adequately conserve fish stocks nor meet the needs of Third World
nations. Despite this opposition to the Convention, its effects can
be seen in a number of agreements addressing the international
overfishing problem. 39 The treaty's provisions, however, cannot
be fully implemented until there is widespread ratification of the
Convention. 240 Widespread ratification is particularly necessary
because the Convention addresses the overfishing problem and
provides a vehicle for dispute settlement. 21 ' This section addresses
the concerns that have been raised about UNCLOS III and outlines
why the benefits that UNCLOS III provides to the fishing industry
outweigh those concerns.242

A. Concerns
Some express concern that UNCLOS III does not benefit all

235

See supra notes 39-69 and accompanying text.

236
See William G. Stormont, Confidence Building for Cooperation in an
Environment of Conflicting Claims to Jurisdiction,in INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: FRAMEWORKS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION 29, 30 (Gerald
Blake et al. eds., 1997).
237
Id. at 30.
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See United Nations Official Website, supra note 68.
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See Deitch, supra note 18, at 55-56.
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See Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 21, at 499.
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See 141 CONG. REc. S3862 (1995).
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nations equally.243 Industrialized nations are better able to take
advantage of the Convention.2' A major impetus for UNCLOS Ill
was that many nations were alarmed by the number of distant
water fishing vessels operating off their coasts.245 Many of these
nations were less developed Third World countries. 24' They led
the charge to extend the EEZ to 200 nautical miles because they
wanted to protect their interests.2 47 These nations did not have the
large navies and fishing fleets that the industrialized nations
enjoyed. 8 Industrialized nations supported open seas because
they wanted to protect their right to fish and pass through waters
unimpeded.2 49 Developing nations argued that the doctrine of
freedom of the seas, is a "Eurocentric law.
Under the freedom
of the seas doctrine, anyone who sails the oceans may harvest their
resources.25 ' The developing nations argued that the doctrine gave
an advantage to industrialized nations since those who had the
most capital, best technological equipment, most cutting-edge
scientific and business know-how got the most fish.252
Although Third World nations won the 200 nautical mile EEZ,
many feel the Convention merely affirmed laws that benefit
industrialized nations. 2 " For instance, the EEZ concept resulted in
benefits to large industrialized nations with long coastlines more
than it helped small developing coastal states.254 In addition,
developed nations with extensive fishing industries are able to
dominate and control fisheries off the coastline of smaller nations
243

See M. Johanne Picard, Comment, International Law of Fisheries and Small

Developing States: A Callforthe Recognition of Regional Hegemony, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
317, 322 (1996). Picard argues that small undeveloped nations need to band together to
form regional hegemonies to protect their interests and take advantage of UNCLOS II.
See id.
244
See id at 322.
245

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 192.
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See id.
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See id. at 194-95, 210.

248

See id. at 210.
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See id.
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Id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Picard, supra note 249, at 322.
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through provisions in the Convention that allow coastal nations to
negotiate fishing agreements. 255 Furthermore, conservation efforts
by one nation may not complement that of a neighbor. 256 Because
fish do not respect national boundaries, 27 the uncoordinated
conservation plans may cancel each other out.
UNCLOS III has also been criticized for failing to conserve
fish stocks.258 International environmental law has gradually
recognized the need to conserve not only species andhabitats but
also the variability of species and global ecosystems. 2 9 Despite
this recognition, some environmentalists argue that international
environmental law does not adequately protect global
biodiversity. 26° The Convention "provides a good starting point for
the conservation of marine biodiversity . . . but the problem
,,211
nevertheless remains.
Chief among its drawbacks is that it
protects freedom of the high seas, which allows virtually unlimited
fishing outside state EEZs.
Others argue that the Convention's devotion to sustainable
development will not adequately conserve resources. 263 Sustainable
development seeks to promote economic growth with the goal
essentially to exploit resources at the highest possible level.264
According to this theory, the problem with sustainable
development and fisheries is that to calculate the sustainable base
of resources properly, one needs exact scientific data about the
size of the resource.265 This information is virtually impossible to
gather.266

255

See id. at 323, 325.

256

See id. at 329.

257

See id.

258

See Anton, supra note 244, at 343; Erin A. Clancy, Note, The Tragedy of the

Global Commons, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
314.
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See Anton, supra note 244, at 355.

STUD.

601 (1998); Mack, supra note 9, at
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See id.
Id. at 357.
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See id. at 361.
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See Clancy, supra note 265, at 607.
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See id. This calculation is known as "maximum sustainable yield." Id.
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See id. at 607.
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See id.
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Finally, other critics fear that the Convention fails to provide a
sufficient framework for cooperation among nations to conserve
resources.267 These and other concerns were addressed in the
agreements that followed UNCLOS 1I.268 These agreements,
built on the framework
which addressed individual .•problems,
269
Ultimately, these agreements
established by the convention.
demonstrate the need for widespread ratification of UNCLOS III,
which would provide an overarching law that addresses
conservation, cooperation, and dispute resolution.
B. Changes Influenced by UNCLOS III
UNCLOS I11 has most visibly changed international fishing by
allowing nations to create 200 nautical-mile EEZs within which
they have declared their right to fish and set conservation laws.271
Roughly ninety-five percent of the world's marine fish catch
comes from within these zones.272 Yet, this division of the ocean
has led to several agreements designed to regulate who may catch
fish that do not adhere to these political boundaries.
One such agreement concerns anadromous stocks, which are
stocks of fish that migrate widely on the open sea but spawn in
inland waters. 7 Under UNCLOS Il, the country in whose waters
the fish spawn has the primary interest and responsibility for
them.274 Fishing for salmon, an anadromous stock, on the high
seas is forbidden by all states unless a nation that previously fished
for them can prove it would suffer economically if it were
prevented from fishing for these stocks. 75 Until the 1980s, Japan
267

See Mack, supra note 9, at 318.

268
See 141 CONG. REC. S3862 (1995). The agreements include the North Pacific
Anadromous Stocks Convention, the "Donut Hole" Convention, and the Food and
Agriculture Organization Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. See id.
269
See id.
270

See id.

271
272

See JUDA, supra note 2, at 258.
See id.

273

See Haimbaugh, supra note 141, at 13.

274

See UNCLOS II, supra note 19, at art. 66.

See 141 CONG. REC. S3862, 3864 (1995). The reason for this prohibition is
both economic and environmental. See id. Salmon grow substantially in their last
months, and so they tend to be worth more if taken in coastal zones and rivers. See id.
275
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had a valid argument that it would suffer economic dislocation if
prevented from fishing for salmon.276 By 1992, however, the
United States, Japan, Russia, and Canada began negotiating a new
treaty. 277 The result was the North Pacific Anadromous Stocks
Convention, which implemented UNCLOS III Article 66 and
ended all salmon fishing on the high seas. 27" According to U.S.
Ambassador David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans in 1995,279 if the United States and other parties to the
Anadromous Stocks Convention ratify UNCLOS III, it would give
salmon-producing states the ability to enforce the prohibition on
salmon fishing because nations violating the treaty could be taken
to compulsory and binding dispute settlement.28 °
"[T]he
availability of such dispute settlement provides not only an
effective tool to enforce the high seas salmon fishing prohibition;
its very existence provides an effective deterrent against such
fishing."28 '
Like the Anadromous Stocks Convention, actions by
fishermen in the 1980s prompted diplomatic action in the early
1990s. 282 Concerned about widespread use of large-scale high seas
driftnets, the United Nations General Assembly passed a
consensus resolution in 1991 creating a moratorium on the use of
such driftnets at the end of 1992.83 While not created under a
specific mandate of UNCLOS III, the moratorium is consistent
with UNCLOS III Article 192, which protects and preserves the
marine environment, and Article 119, which constrains on fishing
in the high seas. 84
UNCLOS III provisions played a key role in the resolution of a

Also, it would be nearly impossible to maintain and preserve salmon producing areas in
coastal rivers if other nations fish for them on the high seas. See id.
276
See id.
277
See id. Provisions in the treaty were included to allow the primary parties to
invite other affected countries, such as China and South Korea, to accede. See id.
278
See id.
279

See id.

280

See id.

281

Id.

282

See id.

283

See id.

284

See UNCLOS Il, supra note 19, art. 119, 192.
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major conflict in the Central Bering Sea in 1994.285 The problem
arose in the mid-1980s, when the vessels of several nations began
to fish a stock of pollack in an area of the Central Bering Sea just
outside the U.S. and Russian 200-mile EEZs.8 6 The fish stock was
largely associated with the U.S. zone and its fisheries. 287 The
international fishery grew quickly, with the annual harvest soon
reaching 1.5 million metric tons or more. 288 American fishermen
increasingly called on the U.S. government to control international
fishing in the Central Bering Sea, also known as the "Bering Sea
Donut Hole., 289 By 1991, negotiations began among the nations
that used the fishery: Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan,
Poland, and the United States. 290 These nations debated over
whether the United States and Russia had a special right to the
stocks. 29' The result was the "Donut Hole Convention,, 292 which
has been described as a "precautionary approach to stock
management.,, 29' Ambassador Colson has argued that UNCLOS
III did not hinder the Donut Hole agreement; in fact, "the Donut
Hole Convention could not have been negotiated without the
framework and foundation provided by the Law of the Sea
Convention.2 94 Among the requirements of the Donut Hole
agreement is that fishing vessels must use real-time satellite
position-fixing transmitters while in the Bering Sea so nations can
ensure that vessels are there only to navigate to and from the
fishing ground.2 95 The agreement also provides for boarding and
inspection of fishing vessels by any party, and it establishes
285

See 141 CONG. REC. S3862, 3863 (1995).

286

See id. at 3865.

287

See id.

288

See id.

289
See JUDA, supra note 2, at 261. The Donut Hole is a 48,000-square-mile area
in the Bering Sea, which is surrounded by the EEZs of the United States and Russia. See
id.
290
See Haward, supranote 223, at 48.
291

See 141 CONG. REC. S3862, 3865 (1995).

At the same time, the United

Nations was hammering out a similar issue at the United Nations Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. See id.
292
See id.
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Haward, supra note 223, at 48.
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procedures to "ensure that no fishing occurs in the Donut Hole
except in accordance with sound conservation and management
rules. 2 96 While the Donut Hole Convention was negotiated with
UNCLOS III in mind,297 according to Ambassador Colson, "the
Law of the Sea Convention can help the Donut Hole Convention
by providing an alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure than
no vessel undertakes conduct in the Central Bering Sea contrary to
the provisions of the Donut Hole Convention., 298 The dispute
settlement provisions of UNCLOS Ill would enable the parties to
"ensure enforcement of multilateral fishery conservation
arrangements on the high seas .... The Law of the Sea dispute

settlement option can act both as a deterrent and as a means to
bring about final resolution
should problems arise in the Donut
299
Hole in the future.,

Finally, the Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
(hereinafter "Flagging Agreement") also implements specific
requirements of UNCLOS III.' ° UNCLOS III Article 91 gives
nations the right to grant nationality to their ships.3° ' The Flagging
Agreement sets the obligations that countries must meet to ensure
their vessels comply with regional conservation and management
arrangements. 0 2 This traditional right of flagging is especially
important in today's world in which modern fishing fleets can
destroy entire fish stocks.0 3 Ratifying UNCLOS III will help
enforce the Flagging Agreement because its provisions call for
cooperation, responsible conservation and management, and allow
nations to
board and inspect foreign vessels accused of illegal
fishing." 4
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id.
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See id.
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Id.

299

Id.

300

See id.

301

See UNCLOS IH,supra note 19, at art. 91. Flag states must be sure there is a

genuine link between themselves and the vessels that fly their flag. See id.
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See 141 CONG. REC. 3862, 3866 (1995).
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See id.
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C. The Need for Major Nations to Ratify UNCLOS III
These agreements indicate the power that UNCLOS III has
had over fishing law. Yet until major fishing nations such as the
United States ratify the convention, it cannot reach its full
potential.05 The United States will suffer if fisheries continue to
decline.3 °6 Although the United States played a major role in
initiating the Convention in 1973, and despite backing from
President Clinton 0 7 and other officials, many predict the Senate to
put up a tough fight before it approves the treaty-if it ever does.30 8
Opposition in the United States is primarily focused on provisions
involving deep seabed mining and navigation rights for naval and
air forces.30 9 The United States historically has been particularly
concerned about retaining its right of innocent passage for
warships through international straits.3 0
Until the United States becomes a party to the Convention,
customary international law and other treaties will set U.S. rights

306

See de Marffy-Mantuano, supra note 24, at 824.
See 141 CONG. REc. 3862 (1995).

307

See U.S. Still at Sea on Key "Treaty, J. COMM. Ocr. 2, 1998, available in

305

LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter At Sea].
308
See id.
309
See id. Western nations, including the United States, saw the deep-sea mining
provisions of the treaty as an attempt to "socialize" the development of ocean resources
and therefore opposed them. Id. Among the deep-sea mining provisions of UNCLOS
Ill, which are contained in Part XI, is the creation of an "International Seabed
Authority," which is given exclusive deep-sea rights. Id. The philosophy governing the
deep-sea mining provisions is that the riches of the sea and the seabed are the "common
heritage of mankind."
Id.
The treaty gives landlocked and "geographically
disadvantaged" nations the fight to participate in the exploitation of resources by its
neighbors, and it requires coastal states to share revenue from their shelves beyond 200
miles. Id. A 1994 "Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI" does away
with some of the provisions that western nations opposed, and it was approved by
President Clinton. Id. U.S. senators, however, continue to oppose the treaty. "The
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, and others continue
to oppose UNCLOS III and the notion that ocean resources are the 'common heritage of
mankind' to be developed by an international bureaucracy." Id. See also KALO, supra
note 1, at 334-37. "The main tasks of the U.S. delegation to UNCLOS Ill, therefore,
were to negotiate a special set of rules for straits passage, maintain the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in any zones of extended national authority, and retain the right
of innocent passage for warships." See KALO, supra note I, at 335. The delegation was
also under pressure to promote the interests of U.S. seabed-mining companies, fishing
fleets, and environmental policies. See KALO, supranote 1, at 335.
310
See KALO, supra note 1, at 334-35
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and duties with respect to international fishing issues.3"' The
United States is already a party to several treaties 1 2 by which it
implements many of the convention's international fishing goals."3
A number of UNCLOS III's provisions have been incorporated
into U.S. domestic law.
The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 established the United
States' fishing policies. 1' 4 "The original act gave the United States
jurisdiction over fishing grounds within 200 miles of the American
coastline."3 '5 Reauthorized by Congress 1' in
1997, the act now
6
implements tough conservation provisions.
U.S. proponents of the Convention argue that the United States
can only benefit from the UNCLOS III negotiations by ratifying
the treaty.3"7 Specifically, the United States would be able to take
advantage of the conservation and dispute settlement provisions,
while also helping stabilize "the customary rules which states now
argue do or do not exist."3 '8 The United States' continued absence

311

See id. at 360.

312

See 141 CONG. REC. 3862 (1995). These treaties are: The 1992 Convention for

the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean; the U.N. General
Assembly Resolution on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet Fishing; the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Pollack Resources in the Central Bering Sea (the
"Donut Hole Agreement"); and the Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. See id.
313
See id.
314

See 16U.S.C.S. § 1853.

The Troubled Seas, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998, § 4, at 20, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Although the act was designed to end rampant overfishing by
excluding foreign fishermen from U.S. waters, it did not solve the overfishing problem.
See id. Rather, U.S. fishermen filled the void. See id. As a result, more than half the
fish stocks off the coast of the United States are "in trouble" from overfishing. Id.
316
See id.
315

317
See 141 CONG. REC. 3862 (1995). Senator Pell stated before the Senate:
"There is no doubt in my mind that this convention will serve the interests of the United
States best from a national security perspective, from an economic perspective, from an
ocean resources perspective and from an environmental perspective." Id.
318
14 CONG REC. 14467, 14475 (1994). U.S. Secretary of State William Perry

argued: "Since the United States is committed to international order determined by the
rule of law, accession will put doubts to rest as to the legal underpinnings of U.S. policy
towards the Convention." Id. Perry also noted that customary international law is
unlikely to incorporate the detail and nuance needed to protect U.S. interests, whereas
UNCLOS III has this needed detail. See id.
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from the treaty may undermine U.S. power to influence the
international law of the sea.3 19
V. Conclusion
Overfishing is a tremendous problem facing the world's
oceans. 320 The problem is perpetuated by individual national
conservation efforts.3 2' Although aimed at curbing overfishing,
these programs have little effect if they apply only to one nation. 322
Fish are a resource that knows no boundaries. A limit on fishing
by one nation does nothing to stop overfishing by another nation
that exploits the same fishery. It also can lead to international
conflict, as is evidenced by the "cod war" between Iceland and the
United Kingdom. 23 Only a joint effort by the world's largest
fishing nations can bring the problem under control.324
UNCLOS III is not perfect.
Still, it is the strongest
comprehensive environmental law agreement ever created. 325 Its
provisions dealing with fisheries conservation and management
stress cooperation and coordination.3 26 The Convention also
provides a framework necessary to implement conservation and
dispute settlement. 37 These provisions are essential for the world
to begin to solve the overfishing problem. 3 2 For example, by
legitimating the EEZ and other zones of control, the Convention
actually encourages nations to work together. 32 9 Nations must
agree on boundaries and on conservation plans.
Widespread support of UNCLOS Inl is necessary to control
overfishing. Even widespread support, however, is not enough if
30

See id. Indeed, William Perry argued that the United States will not easily be

able to make changes to the international law of the sea, should they become necessary,
unless it is a party to the Convention. See id. He warned that "[I]f the United States
were to remain a non-party to the convention, the only way that it could seek to influence
changes in the LOS [Law of the Sea] regime would be through unilateral action, which
could lead to increased international friction." Id.
320 See supra notes 4-29.
321 See supra notes 155-232 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 123-54, 185-232 and accompanying text.
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See JUDA, supranote 2, at 172.
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large fishing nations still do not adhere to the agreement. The
United States and Canada have not yet ratified the convention.
Without their support, the international agreement cannot be
effective.33 °
JENNIFER L. TALHELM
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